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FREE SPEECH, STRICT SCRUTINY, AND A BETTER WAY
TO HANDLE SPEECH RESTRICTIONS
Aaron Pinsoneault*
INTRODUCTION
When it comes to unprotected speech categories, the Roberts Court has taken
an amoral and inaccurate approach.1 When the Court first created unprotected
speech categories—defined categories of speech that are not protected by the First
Amendment—it was unclear what rendered a category of speech unprotected.2 One
school of thought argued that speech was unprotected if it provided little or no value
to society.3 The other school of thought argued that speech was unprotected if it fell
into a certain category of speech that was simply categorically unprotected.4 Then,
in 2010, the Court strongly sided with the latter approach, with the added twist that
unprotected speech categories would be determined solely by reference to American
history and traditions.5 It held that unprotected speech categories were defined solely
with reference to American history, and language that appeared related to interest
balancing was merely “descriptive.”6
This approach was wrong both descriptively and normatively. Descriptively, in the
past, when the Court decided the cases in which it created the modern definitions of
many of the current unprotected speech categories, the Court was consciously departing
from American history and tradition for moral reasons; the moral considerations were
more than descriptive.7 Normatively, by basing unprotected speech categories solely on
history and tradition, the Court has written out mechanisms for revising ill-considered
decisions of the past, which threatens to perpetuate decisions that would be considered immoral by modern standards.8
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2021. I would like to thank my parents,
whose ongoing love and support made this Note (and everything else I have ever achieved)
possible.
1
See infra Parts II–III.
2
See Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment
Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 384–86 (2009); John D. Moore, The Closed and Shrinking
Frontier of Unprotected Speech, 36 WHITTIER L. REV. 1, 11–13 (2014).
3
See Blocher, supra note 2, at 384–86; Ronald K.L. Collins, Exceptional Freedom—The
Roberts Court, the First Amendment, and the New Absolutism, 76 ALB. L. REV. 409, 422–23
(2013); Moore, supra note 2, at 9–11, 17–18.
4
See Blocher, supra note 2, at 384; Moore, supra note 2, at 11–13.
5
See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–72 (2010).
6
Id. at 470–71.
7
See infra Part II.
8
See infra Part III.
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Fortunately, these historical-categorical analyses are not the only analyses applied
to content-based speech restrictions. When a statute would restrict speech based on
the content of that speech, that statute may still withstand constitutional review if it
satisfies a strict scrutiny analysis.9 To pass a strict scrutiny analysis, a law must be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.10 This analysis is flexible,
and it takes into account contemporary-moral interests.11
This Note argues that strict scrutiny is the superior approach—both descriptively
and normatively. It argues that the Court should abandon the historical-categorical
approach, and use only strict scrutiny to analyze content-based speech restrictions.
Part I of this Note describes in detail the various approaches the Court has taken
toward content-based restrictions. It describes how unprotected speech categories
currently interact with a strict scrutiny analysis and details the shift in the Court’s
approach to unprotected speech categories. Part I argues further that unprotected
speech categories are currently determined only by history.
Part II argues that the Roberts Court’s view of unprotected speech categories
does not comport with the actions of prior Courts, specifically the Court throughout
the 1960s and 1970s. Focusing on defamation and commercial speech, Part II shows
that past Courts were willing to depart from tradition for moral reasons.
Part III argues that strict scrutiny is normatively superior to any form of categorical approach. It argues that strict scrutiny ensures a values-driven normative analysis
of laws, while the historical-categorical approach simply assumes that American
history and tradition will render morally justifiable decisions. It further argues that
as long as the Court thinks in terms of unprotected speech categories, the Court is at
risk of allowing history alone to justify modern law.
I. THE CATEGORICAL APPROACHES AND STRICT SCRUTINY
The Supreme Court has developed two general methods of analysis to deal with
First Amendment challenges to content-based speech restrictions. In the first method,
the categorical approach, the Court attempts to determine whether the type of speech
the government is seeking to regulate falls into a category of speech that the First
Amendment does not protect.12 In the second approach, strict scrutiny, the Court will
uphold a speech restriction only when it is “justified by a compelling government
interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest.”13 This Part will lay out the
9

See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 724 (2012) (plurality opinion); Brown
v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011).
10
E.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (citing R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992)); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115, 118 (1991)); Brown, 564 U.S. at 799.
11
See infra notes 178–92 and accompanying text.
12
E.g., Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 717; Brown, 564 U.S. at 791; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
13
Brown, 564 U.S. at 799 (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395).
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subcomponents and precedents that govern the modern formulation of each method
of analysis.14
A. Yesteryear’s Trend Toward the Balancing-Categorical Approach
The categorical approach traces its origins to Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.15
There, in dicta, the Court stated:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting
or “fighting” words—those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has
been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.16
These three sentences gave rise to two competing views of unprotected speech.17
The first approach, the balancing-categorical approach, relies on the final sentence
above.18 Under the balancing-categorical approach, the Court weighs the harm caused
by low-value speech against the benefits that that type of speech provides.19 Under
the balancing-categorical approach, “[i]f a certain kind of speech lack[s] . . . normative
values, then it c[an] easily be added to any list of unprotected speech.”20 Such a list
would essentially be a list of categories of speech that were pre-balanced (i.e., a
balancing analysis had already been done when the category was first added).21
The competing categorical approach, the absolutist-categorical approach, relies
on the first two sentences of the Chaplinsky quote.22 Under this approach, there are
categories of speech that the First Amendment simply does not protect, and these
types of speech can be regulated at will.23 Under the absolutist approach, it was not
14

See infra notes 15–79 and accompanying text.
See 315 U.S. at 571–72.
16
Id.
17
See Collins, supra note 3, at 415–24; Moore, supra note 2, at 7–14.
18
See Moore, supra note 2, at 9–11, 17–18; see also Collins, supra note 3, at 422.
19
See Collins, supra note 3, at 417–22; Moore, supra note 2, at 9.
20
Collins, supra note 3, at 422.
21
See Moore, supra note 2, at 15.
22
See Blocher, supra note 2, at 384; Collins, supra note 3, at 417; Moore, supra note 2,
at 11–12.
23
See Blocher, supra note 2, at 384; Moore, supra note 2, at 11–13.
15
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clear exactly why some categories of speech were unprotected.24 This approach was
the less-popular approach, and it largely survived in a hybridized form as part of the
aforementioned pre-balancing approach.25
The original list of unprotected categories of speech enumerated in Chaplinsky
included, “the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace.”26 It is not entirely clear how many of these categories currently exist.27 The Supreme Court appears to have recognized at least nine
categories: incitement, obscenity, defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct,
fighting words, child pornography, fraud, true threats, and “speech presenting some
grave and imminent threat the government has the power to prevent.”28 In addition,
commercial speech appears to be a defined category receiving only partial protection.29 By one count, there may be at least forty-eight categories of speech that fall
outside the First Amendment’s protection.30
B. The Court Creates the Historical-Categorical Approach
As discussed above, the balancing-categorical approach and the absolutist-categorical approaches appeared to be merging into a hybrid approach largely dominated
by the balancing-categorical approach.31 However, beginning in 2010, the Court
changed course sharply, eliminating the balancing-categorical approach and adopting an absolutist-categorical approach in which American history and tradition would
be the sole justification for the unprotected status of certain types of speech.32
This current approach, the historical-categorical approach, was created in United
States v. Stevens.33 In Stevens, the Supreme Court struck down a criminal statute
designed to punish the “commercial creation, sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty.”34 The law in question, 18 U.S.C. § 48, defined a depiction
of animal cruelty as “one ‘in which a living animal is intentionally maimed, mutilated,
tortured, wounded, or killed,’ if that conduct violates federal or state law where ‘the
24

See Moore, supra note 2, at 13.
See Blocher, supra note 2, at 386; Moore, supra note 2, at 15–16.
26
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
27
See Collins, supra note 3, at 422.
28
Id. at 441 (citing United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (plurality opinion)).
29
See VICTORIA L.KILLION,CONG.RESEARCH SERV., IF11072, FIRST AMENDMENT:CATEGORIES OF SPEECH (2019).
30
See Collins, supra note 3, at 417–22.
31
See Blocher, supra note 2, at 386; Moore, supra note 2, at 15–16.
32
See Collins, supra note 3, at 426–28; Moore, supra note 2, at 17–18.
33
See 559 U.S. 460, 470–72 (2010); Moore, supra note 2, at 18–24.
34
Stevens, 559 U.S. at 464.
25
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creation, sale, or possession takes place.’”35 The statute was passed in order to eliminate
the interstate market for “crush videos,” in which women would slowly crush live
animals to death with their feet, often while speaking in “a kind of dominatrix patter.”36
The respondent, Stevens, had distributed videos of pit bulls engaged in dog fights
and videos of pit bulls attacking other animals.37 Stevens moved to dismiss, arguing
that the statute was “facially invalid under the First Amendment.”38
In response, the government argued that depictions of animal cruelty are devoid
of expressive value and therefore constitute a category of speech that falls outside
of the protection of the First Amendment.39 The government contended that proposed categories of unprotected speech did not require a long history of regulation
in order to be considered unprotected.40 Instead, the government contended that new
categories of unprotected speech could be justified by a determination that the speech
is “of such minimal redeeming value as to render [it] unworthy of First Amendment
protection.”41 The government argued that a categorical exclusion could be made by
a “simple balancing test,” in which the speech would be protected only if the value of
the speech exceeded its cost.42 To support its claim, the government noted instances
in past cases where the Supreme Court stated that unprotected speech was “of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”43
The Court rejected the government’s “free-floating test,” stating that when the
Court has “identified categories of speech as fully outside the protection of the First
Amendment, it has not been on the basis of a simple cost-benefit analysis.”44 The Court
characterized the aforementioned statements as “descriptive” only.45 It held that such
statements “do not set forth a test that may be applied as a general matter to permit
the government to imprison any speaker so long as his speech is deemed valueless
or unnecessary, or so long as an ad hoc calculus of costs and benefits tilts in a
statute’s favor.”46
Although the Court left open the possibility that it has not yet recognized some
categories of unprotected speech, the Court indicated that these categories must have
35

Id. at 465 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 48(c)(1) (1999)).
Id. at 465–66.
37
Id. at 466.
38
Id. at 467.
39
Id. at 469.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 469–70 (citation omitted).
42
Id. at 470.
43
Id. (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (quoting Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942))).
44
Id. at 470–71.
45
See id. at 471.
46
Id.
36
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been “historically unprotected.”47 In such cases, the identification of such a category
would merely formally acknowledge a preexisting historical practice.48
In cases that followed, the Court cemented this change to its doctrine.49 In
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, California attempted to regulate the sale
of violent video games to minors, using language in its statute reminiscent of the
Court’s obscenity jurisprudence.50 However, the Court declined to stretch its
obscenity doctrine to cover depictions of violence and held instead that California
was attempting to create a new category of unprotected speech.51 Then, finding no
longstanding tradition of restricting children’s access to depictions of violence, the
Court found that the statute regulated protected speech.52
The next year, in United States v. Alvarez the Court struck down the Stolen Valor
Act, which punished people for lying about receiving military honors.53 Writing for
the four-justice plurality, Justice Kennedy adopted the Stevens Court’s view of unprotected categories as “confined to the few ‘historic and traditional categories [of
expression] long familiar to the bar.’”54 He reaffirmed that unprotected categories exist
because they “have a historical foundation in the Court’s free speech tradition,”55
and—just as the Court did in Stevens—provided little further explanation for how
these categories initially came into existence.56 Finding no tradition of prohibiting
false statements based purely on the fact that they are false, Justice Kennedy declined
to find that false statements constituted unprotected speech.57 Although Justice Kennedy
engaged with the government’s argument that false statements are valueless and
47

See id. at 472.
See id. (“Maybe there are some categories of speech that have been historically unprotected, but have not yet been specifically identified or discussed as such in our case law.”).
49
See generally, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012); Brown v. Entm’t
Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
50
Brown, 564 U.S. at 789, 792.
51
See id.
52
See id. at 795–99. The Court went on to find that the law could not pass a strict
scrutiny analysis either, and struck it down. Id.
53
Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 715–16, 729–30 (plurality opinion). This Note focuses on the
plurality opinion of Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor and Chief
Justice Roberts. See generally id. The concurring opinion of Justice Breyer, joined by Justice
Kagan, would have struck the law down using a strict scrutiny analysis, finding that the law
was not the least restrictive means to achieve the government’s objective. See id. at 730
(Breyer, J., concurring).
54
Id. at 717 (plurality opinion) (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468
(2010) (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)) (alteration in original)).
55
Id. at 718.
56
See Moore, supra note 2, at 21–23. Compare Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 717–22, with Stevens,
559 U.S. at 468–72 (neither opinion describing the historical basis for the existing categories,
instead articulating only that it exists).
57
See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 722.
48
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therefore unprotected, he ultimately rejected that argument for lack of historical
tradition rather than falsity of premise.58
From this line of cases, it appears that, barring another dramatic change, new
categories of unprotected speech will only be recognized if the country has a long
history of having regulated that type of speech. Moreover, the Court has dismissed
many of its prior decisions as “just . . . descriptive” rather than reflecting any sort of
cost-benefit analysis.59 That view is further reinforced by the lack of any justification
outside of history and tradition to explain why the Court originally accepted these exempted categories.60 Thus, it appears that the Court considers historical tradition
both necessary and sufficient to justify an unprotected category of speech.
C. The Alternative: Strict Scrutiny
In addition to the various categorical approaches to content-based speech restrictions, the Supreme Court may employ a strict scrutiny analysis.61 In this analysis, a
content-based speech restriction will be upheld only if it is “justified by a compelling
government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest.”62 Under this theory,
the speech remains protected even though it has been restricted.63 In this way, strict
scrutiny exists parallel to and separate from the categorical approaches.
Eugene Volokh has identified four “general principles” that the Court employs
when analyzing whether a government interest is compelling.64 First, the government may not “privileg[e] particular subclasses of core protected speech.”65 Second,
the “[a]voidance of offense and restriction of bad ideas are not compelling interests
58

See id. at 719–22.
See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471.
60
See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 717–22; Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468–71; see also Moore, supra
note 2, at 21–22.
61
See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226–27 (2015); Brown v. Entm’t
Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011).
62
Brown, 564 U.S. at 799 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992));
see also Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226. Formally, content-based speech restrictions will be
subjected to the same level of strict scrutiny, but in practice, there is evidence suggesting that
the Court applies varying levels of scrutiny depending on the type of speech sought to be
regulated. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of
Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV 793, 844–57 (2006). See generally
R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Modern Free Speech Doctrine: Strict Scrutiny, Intermediate
Review, and “Reasonableness” Balancing, 8 ELON L. REV. 291 (2016).
63
See Brown, 564 U.S. at 799.
64
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U.PA.L.REV. 2417, 2419–20 (1996). Although this Note employs aspects of Volokh’s
analysis, this Note argues the exact opposite of the thesis of Volokh’s article. See id. at 2460–61.
Volokh believes that the Court ought to “[r]eject strict scrutiny, and operate through categorical rules and categorical exceptions.” Id. at 2460. This disagreement in views does not
stem from a disagreement over whether his descriptive framework is accurate.
65
Id. at 2419.
59

252

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 29:245

by themselves.”66 Third, “[a] law’s underinclusiveness . . . may be evidence that an
interest is not compelling.”67 Fourth, “[t]he government . . . may not assert a compelling interest in fighting one particular ill, and then refuse to deal with other ills that
seem almost indistinguishable.”68 In addition to those principles, Volokh identifies
a variety of interests that the Court has or has not found to be compelling.69
Volokh also finds four components in a narrow tailoring analysis.70 First, “the
government must prove to the Court’s satisfaction that the law actually advances the
interest.”71 Second, the law may not be overinclusive (i.e., it may not “restrict[] a significant amount of speech that doesn’t implicate the government interest”).72 Third,
the law must be the least restrictive means to accomplish that interest.73 Fourth, and
finally, the law may not be underinclusive (i.e., it may not “fail[] to restrict a significant amount of speech that harms the government interest to about the same
degree as does the restricted speech”).74
It is unclear precisely when the Supreme Court first applied strict scrutiny to a
content-based speech regulation. In 1972, in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,
the Court applied strict scrutiny to a restriction on all non-labor picketing near schools,
but did so using the Equal Protection Clause.75 In 1987, the Court applied strict scrutiny to strike down a sales tax meant to promote fledgling newspapers, but did so
because the tax was an impermissible restriction on the freedom of the press.76 It seems
to have taken until 1991 for the Court to formally apply strict scrutiny as a test under
the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.77 In any case, strict scrutiny is significantly newer than the categorical approach, which began in 1942 with Chaplinsky78
and continued to be acknowledged and developed long before even the earliest use
of strict scrutiny in the free speech context.79
66

Id.
Id. at 2420.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 2420–21.
70
Id. at 2421–23.
71
Id. at 2422.
72
Id.
73
Id. (“A law is not narrowly tailored if there are less speech-restrictive means available
that would serve the interest essentially as well as would the speech restriction.”).
74
Id. at 2423.
75
See 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972) (first citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); and
then citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342–43 (1972)). Mosley has often been cited
in cases considering free speech challenges. See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464,
477 (2014); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557,
579 (1995); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983).
76
See Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 223, 231 (1987).
77
See Kelso, supra note 62, at 296; see also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991).
78
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
79
See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (defining the
67
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II. DESCRIPTIVE SUPERIORITY
Much of the modern First Amendment law on unprotected speech categories is
derived from cases decided from the early 1960s through the mid-1970s (hereinafter
“the early modern period”).80 These include definitional cases regarding defamation,81
incitement,82 obscenity,83 and commercial speech.84 During the early modern period,
the Court readily abdicated traditional common law regarding these speech categories
in order to protect valuable speech.85
These changes were driven by normative considerations rather than a change in
the way the Court interpreted American traditions respecting these categories.86
Therefore, the historical-categorical approach—which takes history and tradition as
determinative87—poorly explains these decisions. The policy considerations in these
cases were determinative, not merely “descriptive.”88
The decisions in the early modern period are better viewed as containing nascent
strict scrutiny analyses. Decisions made during the early modern period were motivated
by the Court’s desire to protect—and avoid incidentally burdening—high-value
speech.89 Although the Court did not explicitly use the terms “narrowly tailored”90 or
unprotected speech category of “inciting or producing imminent lawless action”). See generally
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (setting forth many of the requirements of
modern libel law).
80
See generally John Seigenthaler, First Amendment Timeline, https://www.mtsu.edu
/first-amendment/page/first-amendment-timeline (last visited Oct. 22, 2020) (laying out a
timeline of significant First Amendment historical events, cases, and concepts).
81
See generally, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (constitutionalizing libel law); Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (finding that false statements made “knowingly” or “with
reckless disregard of the truth” are not protected under the Constitution).
82
See generally, e.g. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444 (describing the distinction between
constitutionally protected expression and imminent threats to public safety).
83
See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (holding that obscenity is not
constitutionally protected and setting forth the framework for classifying content as obscene
or not obscene).
84
See generally Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (holding that Virginia could not
censor or criminalize the promulgation of advertisements for abortion services in New York).
85
See infra notes 96–175 and accompanying text.
86
See infra notes 96–175 and accompanying text.
87
See Moore, supra note 2, at 21–22 (“Now, speech could only be categorically excluded
from the First Amendment if a historical-categorical analysis showed that the speech category
had been unprotected in the past. History, not balancing, would be the guide for identifying
unprotected low-value speech.”).
88
See infra notes 96–175 and accompanying text. Contra United States v. Stevens, 559
U.S. 460, 471 (2010).
89
See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72; see also infra notes
96–175 and accompanying text.
90
See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (citing R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992)).
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“compelling government interest,”91 one would not necessarily expect it to; these cases
were decided long before the Court had an explicit First Amendment strict scrutiny
doctrine.92 The important thing is that the Court was deeply concerned with the policy
considerations underlying the strict scrutiny analysis.93 These considerations led the
Court to depart radically from traditional common law, especially with regard to
defamation and commercial speech.94 These radical changes are easily explicable as
the result of a nascent strict scrutiny analysis, but they are inexplicable under the
historical-categorical approach.95
A. Libel
In its canonical defamation cases, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Garrison
v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court greatly expanded protections for speech criticizing
government officials.96 These cases marked the first time in which the Court explicitly condemned the concept of seditious libel.97 In doing so, the Court displayed a
marked shift from the attitudes of the founding-era Supreme Court Justices, in which
four of six Justices on the Supreme Court in 1798 and 1799 endorsed the Sedition
Act while trying cases in circuit courts.98
In Sullivan, the Supreme Court expressed a great deal of concern for allowing
would-be critics of the government sufficient “breathing space” to make allegations
against the government that the critics believed to be true.99 Under Alabama law,
91

See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011).
See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text.
93
See infra notes 107–75 and accompanying text.
94
See infra notes 96–175 and accompanying text.
95
See infra notes 96–175 and accompanying text.
96
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding that false
statements would be protected unless a plaintiff could demonstrate “actual malice”); Garrison
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73–75 (1964) (holding that true statements are not libelous,
regardless of the motive for which they were published).
97
See Michael T. Gibson, The Supreme Court and Freedom of Expression from 1791 to
1917, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 272 (1986).
98
Id. at 274. The Sedition Act “imposed criminal penalties on anyone who published false,
scandalous, and malicious writing against the federal government, Congress, or the President
with the intent to defame them.” Id. at 273 (citing ch. 74, § 1, 1 Stat. 596 (1798)). Gibson
attributes the Justices’ support for the Sedition Act to the Justices’ partisan support for President
John Adams and the Federalist Party, to which all six belonged. Id. at 274–75. Although the
Justices may not have been motivated by a legalistic analysis of the scope of the First Amendment, their support for the Sedition Act at the very least demonstrates that the early Justices
were untroubled by a conflict between such a law and the First Amendment. The government
continued to punish seditious libel into the early twentieth century. See Seigenthaler, supra
note 80.
99
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271–72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
92
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speech was libelous per se if it brought a public official “into public contempt.”100
Once established, the defendant had the burden to prove that his allegations were
“true in all their particulars.”101
The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment required greater protections
than the limited affirmative defense provided under Alabama common law.102 It held
that the “true in all their particulars” requirement was unconstitutionally burdensome
because it would deter good-faith critics from voicing their complaints, doubting
their ability to prove their critiques in court or fear of the cost of doing so.103 The
Court required that, in addition to the burden of showing the falsehood of the libelous
statements, the plaintiff had the burden to show that the defendant had acted with
“actual malice.”104 The Court imposed the “actual malice” requirement because it believed incorrect statements are inevitable in free speech, and allowing public officials
to hold their critics liable would stifle free and open debate.105
Sullivan was a marked departure from the earliest practices of Supreme Court
libel law.106 In its nineteenth century jurisprudence, the Court ignored federal and state
constitutions, instead basing its decisions on treatises, English cases, and state court
cases.107 Whatever developments that were made in early Supreme Court libel cases
were due to state law developments.108 Thus, the Sullivan Court departed from
America’s historical traditions by even considering the First Amendment in a libel
case.109 Striking down Alabama common law on First Amendment grounds was a
serious coup.110
Just as importantly, the Supreme Court deviated from tradition due specifically
to concerns about burdening valuable speech.111 Although the Court did not describe
the common law as an invalid, overinclusive, content-based speech regulation, it
viewed the common law as such.112 Thus, the Court altered the common law due to
100

Id. at 263 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 37 (Ala. 1962)).
Id. at 267 (first citing Ala. Ride Co. v. Vance, 178 So. 438 (Ala. 1938); and then citing
Johnson Publ’g Co. v. Davis, 124 So. 2d 441, 457–58 (Ala. 1960)).
102
See id. at 279.
103
See id. at 267, 279.
104
Id. at 279–80. Actual malice is defined as “knowledge that [the statement] was false
or . . . reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Id. at 280.
105
See id. at 271–72, 280.
106
See Gibson, supra note 97, at 280.
107
See id.
108
See id. at 279–80.
109
See id. at 280.
110
Compare Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80, with Gibson, supra note 97, at 280–81.
111
See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 (“[W]ould-be critics of official conduct may be deterred
from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact
true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to
do so.” (emphasis added)).
112
See id.
101
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a nascent concern for narrow tailoring, a telltale marker of a strict scrutiny
analysis.113
In Garrison v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court further modified the common law
by invalidating the “good motives” element for an affirmative defense of truth.114
Under Louisiana’s criminal libel law, it was not sufficient that the statements in
question were true; they also had to be made “‘with good motives and for justifiable
ends.’”115 This historical limitation reflected the belief that a person should not have
to tolerate their dirty laundry being aired in public simply because the facts alleged
were true.116 In Garrison, the Court instead adopted a view that the public had an
overwhelming interest in true information regarding public officials, regardless of
the motive for which that information was made public.117
In rejecting the common law “good motives” requirement, the Court consciously
departed with the majority common law rule.118 Moreover, the “good motives”
requirement was often the predominant concern of historical defamation cases, and
the Court still thought it was appropriate to abrogate the rule entirely.119 Such an
action is entirely inconsistent with the historical-categorical approach in which unprotected speech categories are merely the result of historical tradition.120
If, instead, one reads Garrison as containing a nascent strict scrutiny analysis,
the jurisprudential shift becomes explicable. Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the “good
motives” requirement was not narrowly tailored because it burdened speech that the
government did not have a compelling interest in regulating.121 Alternatively, the “good
motives” requirement can be viewed as having failed the “compelling interest” prong
of the analysis; that is, the government has no compelling interest in suppressing true
statements about public officials merely to avoid giving offense to those officials.122
113

See Volokh, supra note 64, at 2421–24.
See 379 U.S. 64, 72–75 (1964).
115
Id. at 70.
116
See id. at 72. The rule stemmed from “abhorrence that ‘a man’s forgotten misconduct,
or the misconduct of a relation, in which the public had no interest, should be wantonly raked
up, and published to the world, on the ground of it[] being true.’” Id. (quoting 69 Parl Deb
HC (3d ser.) (1843) col. 1230 (UK) (Report of Lord Campbell)).
117
See id. at 72–73 (“‘If upon a lawful occasion for making a publication, he has
published the truth, and no more, there is no sound principle which can make him liable,
even if he was actuated by express malice. . . .’” (quoting State v. Burnham, 9 N.H. 34,
42–43 (1837))).
118
See id. at 70–72 n.7 (finding a “good motives” requirement in the law of twenty-seven
states whereas truth was a complete defense in, at most, twelve states).
119
See Gibson, supra note 97, at 280–81.
120
See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–72 (2010).
121
See Garrison, 379 U.S. at 72, 77 (“The public-official rule protects the paramount
public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public officials, their
servants. To this end, anything which might touch on an official’s fitness for office is relevant.”); see also Volokh, supra note 64, at 2422.
122
See Garrison, 379 U.S. at 73 (“If there is a lawful occasion—a legal right to make a
114
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In either case, a strict scrutiny analysis better explains why the Court amended the
historical common law of defamation to bring it in line with the Court’s modern,
speech-protective values.
Because strict scrutiny analyses are not inherently tethered to historical traditions,
the nascent strict scrutiny approach can explain why some defamation cases appear
to have faded out of the Supreme Court’s canons. In 1952 (before many of the marquee
cases discussed in this Note were decided), the Court decided Beauharnais v. Illinois,
where it upheld Illinois’s anti-hate speech law as a form of group-level criminal libel
law.123 There the Court combined a historical analysis of the constitutionality of
criminal libel laws124 with the pressing concern of racial tension and violence in
Illinois to uphold the law.125
Twenty-six years later, the Village of Skokie, Illinois relied on Beauharnais to
support the constitutionality of ordinances designed to prevent neo-Nazis from demonstrating in the Village.126 The Seventh Circuit rejected Skokie’s argument.127 In doing
so, it both differentiated the Skokie case and questioned whether, in light of more recent
jurisprudence, Beauharnais remained good law.128 The Supreme Court refused to
grant certiorari in the case.129 In his dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that the Skokie
case was in conflict with the Beauharnais decision, and he would have seen the Court
actively take up the question of whether Beauharnais remained good law.130 By allowing the Seventh Circuit to apparently disregard Supreme Court precedent,131 the
Court indicated that the Beauharnais decision was no longer worthy of protection.
Notably, at no point did the Seventh Circuit suggest Beauharnais had misapplied the traditional analysis; rather, it suggested that the traditional analysis was no
longer applicable.132 To the extent that the Court acquiesced to this analysis, the
publication—and the matter [is] true, the end is justifiable, and that, in such case, must be
sufficient.” (quoting Burnham, 9 N.H. at 42–43)). See also Volokh, supra note 64, at 2419–20.
123
See 343 U.S. 250, 258 (1952). The statute punished any “publication . . . [which] portrays
depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color,
creed or religion which . . . exposes the citizens . . . to contempt, . . . which is productive of
breach of the peace or riots.” Id. at 251 (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, ¶ 471 (1949)).
124
See id. at 256–58. The Court employed a historical-categorical approach to conclude
that criminal libel laws had been constitutionally recognized since “time out of mind.” Id.
However, the Court noted that the issue was not “concluded by history and practice.” Id. at 258.
125
Id. at 258–61 (noting Illinois’s history of violence caused by racial animus).
126
See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1204–05 (7th Cir. 1978) (citing Beauharnais, 343
U.S. at 250).
127
See id. at 1204.
128
See id. Notably, the Seventh Circuit was not the first circuit to challenge the continued
validity of Beauharnais. See Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1094–95 (8th Cir. 1973).
129
Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
130
Id. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
131
See id.
132
See Collin, 578 F.2d at 1204.
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Supreme Court, too, allowed its own modern free speech values to supersede its
precedent.133 Thus, the Supreme Court allowed Beauharnais to fall by the wayside
for reasons other than a changed understanding of America’s history and traditions
regarding hate speech. As such, the historical-categorical approach cannot explain
why the Court allowed Beauharnais to fade away.134
However, a nascent strict scrutiny approach explains this decision easily. The
Beauharnais decision did not reflect the types of concerns the Court expressed in
modern libel cases.135 Therefore, because Beauharnais could not be supported by deference to history, and because it appeared to conflict with modern libel jurisprudence,
it was no longer canonical.136
The shift in the Supreme Court’s defamation jurisprudence is wholly inconsistent with Stevens’s historical-categorical description of unprotected categories of
speech.137 Although there may have been some speech restrictions called “libel”
throughout American history,138 the Supreme Court altered those laws in such a way
that little but the designation remains unaltered in modern jurisprudence.139 In the
past, libel did not even need to be false, much less actually maliciously so.140 Moreover, far from granting extra protection to critics of public officials,141 early justices
expressed support for laws punishing sedition.142 Thus, it is hardly correct to say
there is any tradition “[f]rom 1791 to the present”143 to support the modern conception of libel laws.
If, instead, one looks for a nascent strict scrutiny analysis, one will find a robust
explanation for the change. During the early modern period, the Supreme Court
revisited common law defamation decisions—it found that the common law was not
narrowly tailored and that some aspects of the common law may not even have been
motivated by a compelling government interest.144 Therefore, the Supreme Court
altered the defamation law to better protect what it currently recognizes as valuable
speech. Because of this value shift, some cases, like Beauharnais, needed to fade
133

See Smith, 439 U.S. at 919.
See supra notes 31–60 and accompanying text.
135
See Collin, 578 F.2d at 1205.
136
See id.
137
See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–72 (2010); see also Brown v. Entm’t
Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 792 (2011) (citing Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470) (requiring “persuasive
evidence” that a proposed unprotected category of speech be “part of a long (if heretofore
unrecognized) tradition of proscription”).
138
See Gibson, supra note 97, at 272.
139
See supra notes 96–121 and accompanying text.
140
See Gibson supra note 97, at 280–82.
141
See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64 (1964).
142
See Gibson, supra note 97, at 274–75.
143
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992)).
144
See supra notes 96–121 and accompanying text.
134
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from the Supreme Court canons.145 Thus, a nascent strict scrutiny explanation describes
the current state of defamation laws.
B. Commercial Speech
During the early modern period, the Court also began to protect commercial
speech under the First Amendment.146 This departure from the common law, in which
commercial speech was unprotected,147 was a step beyond even the major alterations
to the law of defamation. Here, the Court did not merely redefine commercial speech
to better protect valuable aspects of advertising; instead, the Court removed commercial speech from the list of unprotected speech categories.148
Initially, states concluded that commercial speech was unprotected because of
the 1942 Supreme Court case Valentine v. Chrestensen.149 In Valentine, the Court heard
a challenge to a New York City ordinance that forbade the distribution of “commercial and business advertising matter” in the street.150 In a perfunctory opinion, the
Court held that the Constitution did not place a “restraint on government as respects
purely commercial advertising.”151 Without further explanation, the Court simply held
that regulation of commercial speech was a “matter[] for legislative judgment.”152
In 1975, the Court changed its tune. In Bigelow v. Virginia, the Court considered
Virginia’s ban on advertising by abortion providers.153 Relying on the Valentine decision, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not affect the
statute because it affected commercial speech.154 The Virginia Supreme Court upheld
the ban as a valid exercise of the police power.155
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the First Amendment protects even paid commercial advertisements.156 The Court held that cases subsequent
to Valentine indicated that the case did not have as broad of an effect as the Virginia
courts suggested.157 The Court distinguished Bigelow from Valentine on the grounds
that the advertisements in Valentine “simply propose[d] a commercial transaction,”
145

See supra notes 122–44 and accompanying text.
See generally Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
147
See generally Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
148
See generally id.
149
See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 818–19; see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463
U.S. 60, 64 n.6 (1983) (explaining that before Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 809, commercial speech
was unprotected under Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54).
150
Valentine, 316 U.S. at 53.
151
Id. at 54.
152
Id.
153
Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 812.
154
Id. at 814 (citing Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54).
155
Id. at 814 (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 191 S.E.2d 173, 176 (Va. 1972)).
156
Id. at 818.
157
Id. at 820.
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whereas the advertisement in Bigelow “contained factual material of clear ‘public
interest.’”158 Therefore, the Court found that the Virginia courts had misapplied
Valentine.159 Just eight years later, however, the Court would correctly come to view
Bigelow as having overruled Valentine.160
The Court in Bigelow took a remarkable approach to commercial speech.161
Unlike in the Court’s defamation doctrine, the Court did not view itself as protecting
the speakers’ right to participate in public discussion.162 Instead, the Court saw itself
as protecting readers’ right to consume information that might benefit them.163 Thus,
the Court recognized a cognizable First Amendment interest in the speech of another
due to a strong interest in the consumption of information.164 In subsequent cases,
the Court continued to protect commercial speech on the grounds that the public had
a discernable interest in consuming information contained in commercial speech.165
Just as in the defamation cases discussed in Section II.A,166 Bigelow was decided
on the basis of normative interest–based concerns rather than a thorough analysis of
America’s historical treatment of commercial speech.167 Although the Bigelow Court
suggested that state courts had been misreading its holding in Valentine,168 the Court
acknowledged later that commercial speech had in fact been unprotected until
Bigelow.169 Thus, the shift in Supreme Court doctrine cannot be based on a new
158

Id. at 822. The advertisement in Bigelow would have informed readers that abortions
were legal in New York without a residency requirement. Id. at 812. The advertisement in
Valentine solicited visitors to view a former Navy submarine. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316
U.S. 52, 52–53 (1942).
159
Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 825.
160
See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64 n.6 (1983).
161
See generally Bigelow, 421 U.S. 809.
162
Compare N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278–79 (1964) (discussing the
speaker’s right to voice criticism of a public official), with Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822 (discussing the right of the reader to learn information).
163
Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822 (“[T]he advertisement conveyed information of potential
interest and value to a diverse audience not only to readers possibly in need of the services offered, but also to those with a general curiosity about, or genuine interest in, the subject matter
or the law of another State and its development, and to readers seeking reform in Virginia.”).
164
See id.
165
See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 365–66 (1977) (striking down a rule barring
attorneys from advertising the cost of their services because it “serv[ed] to inhibit the free
flow of commercial information and to keep the public in ignorance”); Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 754 (1976) (striking down a ban on
the advertisement of drug prices by pharmacies because “the First Amendment entitles the user
of prescription drugs to receive information that pharmacists wish to communicate to them
through advertising and other promotional means concerning the prices of such drugs.”).
166
See supra notes 96–145 and accompanying text.
167
See generally Bigelow, 421 U.S. 809; Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254; Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64 (1964).
168
See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 825.
169
See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64 n.6 (1983).
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understanding of historical tradition. Therefore, just as with the defamation cases,
a historical-categorical approach offers little to explain this development.170
However, if one views the Court as having undertaken a nascent strict scrutiny
analysis, one will find that the Court found that Virginia failed to assert a compelling government interest.171 The Court found that Virginia did not have a compelling
interest in regulating its citizens’ consumption of information about activities in
other states; therefore, it could not restrict speech to further that interest.172 Although
Virginia also asserted an interest in protecting the quality of its medical services, the
Court found that the statute in question did nothing to advance that interest.173 Thus,
the statute failed the narrow tailoring prong with respect to that interest.174 The Court
essentially decided to protect commercial speech after undertaking a strict scrutiny
analysis.175 As such, the nascent strict scrutiny explanation again has far more descriptive power than the historical-categorical approach.
C. When to Start the Clock
To have descriptive validity, especially with respect to defamation and commercial speech, the historical-categorical approach needs to start the clock on American
traditions after the early modern period.176 While those espousing the historicalcategorical approach claim they trace unprotected speech categories back to 1791,
a historical-categorical approach that explicitly starts examining tradition since the
early modern period may more accurately describe how it actually operates.177
Moreover, this corrective measure would collapse under its own weight. Although proponents of the historical-categorical approach would more accurately
describe their beliefs by starting the clock after the early modern period, they still
would not actually follow the tradition set by the Court in this period. As shown above,
the early modern Courts did not see themselves as bound rigidly to prior practice.
Rather, these Courts based their decisions in policy considerations that aligned closely
with a modern strict scrutiny analysis. Therefore, even a time-corrected historicalcategorical approach would fail to accurately mirror the traditions of the early
170

See supra notes 31–60 and accompanying text.
See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 827–28 (“[Virginia] is . . . advancing an interest in shielding
its citizens from information about activities outside Virginia’s borders, activities that
Virginia’s police powers do not reach. This asserted interest . . . was entitled to little, if any,
weight under the circumstances.”).
172
See id.
173
See id. at 827.
174
See Volokh, supra note 64, at 2422 (“For a law to be narrowly tailored, the government
must prove to the Court’s satisfaction that the law actually advances the interest.”).
175
See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 827–29.
176
See supra notes 96–175 and accompanying text. As these cases have now been law for
over half a century, the practice they lay out could credibly be called a tradition.
177
See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010).
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modern Courts, which it would purport to follow. As such, the historical-categorical
approach cannot merely be fine-tuned to more accurately reflect the tradition that
its proponents actually follow. The more descriptively accurate approach is to view
the early modern period Courts as having undertaken nascent strict scrutiny analyses.
III. NORMATIVE SUPERIORITY
Strict scrutiny analyses are better situated to render ethical decisions than the
historical-categorical approach. A strict scrutiny analysis requires that the Court undertake a flexible, value-driven analysis, which in turn helps to ensure that decisions
regarding content-based speech restrictions will be reasonable in light of contemporary values.178 The historical-categorical approach, however, merely continues
traditional practices without regard for whether those traditions are justified in light
of contemporary values. Moreover, even if the Court were to allow for a balancing
analysis as part of a categorical approach—eschewing the historical-categorical
approach—it will likely still render many decisions based on value judgments made
by past Courts without regard for whether those decisions were justified. Therefore,
both the historical-categorical approach and the balancing-categorical approach
ultimately trade quality for often-arbitrary certainty.
A. Strict Scrutiny Is Driven by Moral Values
Strict scrutiny is a value-driven, interest-balancing approach weighted heavily
in favor of protecting individual speech, while allowing for the possibility of precise,
justified, and minimal governmental encroachment when necessary.179 Strict scrutiny
is driven by moral values, and a strict scrutiny analysis forces the Court to argue in
terms of fairness and equality, with heavy emphasis on protecting individuals’ speech
rights.180 By forcing the Court to make careful value-based judgments, strict scrutiny
is designed to produce ethically justified decisions.
The first prong of a strict scrutiny analysis is self-evidently value-based; the government must be actually motivated by (as opposed to merely asserting) a compelling interest.181 Subject to some guiding principles, the Court ultimately makes a
178

See infra notes 179–93 and accompanying text.
See Volokh, supra note 64, at 2418–19 (“The Court makes a normative judgment about
the ends: Is the interest important enough to justify a speech restriction? And the Court
makes a primarily empirical judgment about the means: If the means do not actually further
the interest, are too broad, are too narrow, or are unnecessarily burdensome, then the government can and should serve the end through a better-drafted law.”). Although Volokh believes
the Court’s analysis is primarily a factual inquiry into whether a law is, in fact, narrowly
tailored, see id. at 2424, each factual inquiry he describes is driven by normative concerns.
See Kelso, supra note 62, at 302–03.
180
See Kelso, supra note 62, at 302 (referring to fairness and equality in terms of Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses).
181
See Volokh, supra note 64, at 2418–19.
179
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normative judgment regarding whether the government’s actual interest is compelling enough to warrant a content-based speech restriction.182 This inquiry is flexible,
and the government does not need to assert any historical tradition supporting its
asserted interest.183 Thus, the Court is more likely to govern content-based speech
restrictions in a manner that reflects contemporary, rather than historical, values, just
as it did in the early modern period nascent strict scrutiny analyses.184 Granted, it is
not certain that contemporary values are superior to past values, but because this
approach is flexible, it allows for readjustment toward past values upon a realization
that contemporary values have led the Court away from a wiser path. Thus, in the
long run, strict scrutiny likely ensures that the government may only pass contentbased restrictions pursuant to aims that Americans who are subject to the challenged
laws would view as legitimate.
The second prong is less obviously value-based—to the point that Volokh asserts
that it is a factual inquiry185—but it is nonetheless an inquiry motivated by ethical
concerns.186 Each narrow-tailoring consideration Volokh lists187 helps to ensure that
the government pursues its compelling interest only while preserving fairness and
equality.188 By ensuring that the law actually advances the compelling interest, the
Court ensures that the law will actually achieve the purported benefits justifying the
speech restriction.189 By ensuring the law is not overinclusive, the Court ensures that
the government is not accidentally regulating individuals who are not part of the problem.190 By ensuring the statute is the least restrictive alternative, the Court ensures
that the law does not oppress the individuals who are the focus of the statute.191 Finally,
by ensuring the law is not underinclusive, the Court promotes equality by ensuring
that the government regulates all individuals who are part of the problem.192
Through this systematic process, a strict scrutiny analysis forces the Court to
identify important values, and it forces the Court to in turn force the government to
pursue those values only in such a way that is precise, fair, and minimally invasive.193
In this way, strict scrutiny provides a structured process by which the Court can
render carefully considered judgments that reflect American values.
182

See id. at 2418–21.
See supra notes 61–79 and accompanying text; see also Volokh, supra note 64, at
2418–21.
184
See supra Part II.
185
See Volokh, supra note 64, at 2424.
186
See Kelso, supra note 62, at 302.
187
See Volokh, supra note 64, at 2422–23.
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See Kelso, supra note 62, at 302.
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See id.
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See id.
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See id.
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See id.
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See id.
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B. The Historical-Categorical Approach Is an “Is-Ought” Fallacy
The historical-categorical approach renders constitutional decisions without any
explicit consideration of the moral values underlying a challenged, content-based
speech restriction or unprotected speech categories. Instead, the historical-categorical approach renders decisions as to how a certain type of speech ought to be treated
by determining how it has been treated.194 In this way, the Court outsources ethical
considerations to courts of the past, regardless of the reasoning underlying those
courts’ decisions.195 Therefore, the historical-categorical approach does little to ensure
that the Court’s decisions will be ethical. Such an approach risks cementing bad decisions for no better reason than that those decisions were at one time deemed correct.
Nothing in the historical-categorical approach requires that the Court render
moral judgments when evaluating content-based speech restrictions. On the contrary,
as argued in Part I, the Supreme Court now almost exclusively considers history and
tradition as the standards by which unprotected speech categories will be judged.196
Although the Supreme Court indicated that it may expand its list of unprotected speech
categories, it also indicated that it will make such alterations only if it is presented with
an adequate historical record to support the expansion.197 From this, one can infer
that the Court may similarly be willing to alter its definitions of existing unprotected
speech categories if it is presented with adequate historical evidence.198 However,
the Court has indicated that it will not alter its unprotected speech categories for
purely moral reasons.199
There is no reason to believe that an approach that focuses exclusively on a factual
analysis of American history will render morally justifiable judgments. The historicalcategorical approach focuses on what “[was], and [was] not,” but then the approach
194

See supra notes 31–60 and accompanying text (arguing that the historical-categorical
approach views tradition as necessary and sufficient to justify an unprotected speech category).
195
See supra notes 31–60 and accompanying text.
196
See supra notes 31–60 and accompanying text.
197
See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 722 (2012) (plurality opinion) (“Before exempting a category of speech from the normal prohibition on content-based restrictions, . . . the
Court must be presented with ‘persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content is part
of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription.’” alteration in original) (quoting
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 792 (2011)); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.
460, 472 (2010) (“Maybe there are some categories of speech that have been historically unprotected, but have not yet been specifically identified or discussed as such in our case law.”).
198
See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 722; Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472.
199
See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 717 (“[T]his Court has rejected as ‘startling and dangerous’
a ‘free-floating test for First Amendment coverage . . . [based on] an ad hoc balancing of
relative social costs and benefits.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Stevens, 559 U.S. at
470)); Brown, 564 U.S. at 791 (“[N]ew categories of unprotected speech may not be added
to the list by a legislature that concludes certain speech is too harmful to be tolerated.”);
Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471 (stating that there is no “test that may be applied as a general matter
to permit the Government to imprison any speaker so long as . . . an ad hoc calculus of costs
and benefits tilts in a statute’s favor.”).
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makes a subtle shift to “an ought, or an ought not.”200 In this manner, the Court would
commit the is-ought fallacy;201 it would make an “evaluative conclusion . . . from . . .
purely factual premises.”202 However, a mere analysis of facts, devoid of reference
to moral considerations, cannot rationally lead to a conclusion about morality.203
The historical-categorical approach outsources “ought, or ought not” considerations to Americans of the past.204 The Court tacitly accepts the moral judgment of
past Courts and prior generations by determining speech rights with reference to
traditions dating back to 1791.205 Proponents of the historical-categorical approach
argue that this anchoring to the past adds a degree of certainty that restrains the government from simply declaring a category of speech as too harmful to be protected by
the First Amendment.206 Although it is correct that the historical-categorical approach is more certain than the free speech approach, it does not necessarily follow
that the historical-categorical approach is therefore more speech-protective.
The historical-categorical approach is only speech-protective if past generations
were speech protective with respect to a certain type of speech. For instance, from
1791 to 1917, Americans were typically less free to criticize public figures than
Americans today.207 The modern, speech-protective defamation law arose because
the Court consciously broke from that tradition.208 Moreover, throughout the years,
the Supreme Court has developed a robust anti-canon, which includes decisions
expanding slavery,209 upholding Jim Crow segregation,210 upholding flagrantly sexist
laws,211 striking down protections for workers,212 and affirming Japanese internment.213
Clearly, traditions are not inherently rights-protective.
Under the historical-categorical approach, the Court does not appear able to
overturn prior bad decisions because the decisions and their impacts are no longer
200
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morally tolerable.214 In this way, the historical-categorical approach puts too much
faith in the moral judgment of past generations. In doing so, it risks permanently
instantiating past decisions rendered based on moral judgments that no longer comport
with modern conceptions of free speech, such as the lack of protection for commercial speech.215 The Court would, under the historical-categorical approach, accept
the good judgments along with the bad ones.
This is the ultimate flaw with attempting to render ethical decisions with reference
only to factual considerations. The state of the world may or may not be just. The
Court must consider modern values if it hopes to ensure that modern speech restrictions
are ethical. Strict scrutiny considers values.216 The historical-categorical approach
does not.217 Therefore, strict scrutiny is more likely to render ethical judgments.
C. A Constant Temptation
A categorical approach is not inherently unable to take into account moral value
judgments.218 Under the now-disregarded balancing-categorical approach, the Court
would weigh the harms and benefits of a particular type of speech to determine
whether that type of speech was protected by the First Amendment.219 This approach
to unprotected speech categories readily allows for change.220 In fact, the nascent
strict scrutiny analysis that birthed modern defamation law could also be seen as having
taken place under the balancing-categorical approach.221 Thus, one can envision a
categorical approach that attempts to derive an ought from an ought.222
In practice, however, the Court has struggled to alter unprotected speech categories
once they have been identified, even when the Court was utilizing a more flexible
214
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categorical approach.223 The Court, for instance, has not shown a willingness to
protect any of the original unprotected speech categories identified in Chaplinsky.224
Even a more flexible balancing approach appears damaged by historical inertia.225
For instance, in the early modern period, the Court heard the obscenity case
Miller v. California.226 Miller was decided at a time when the Supreme Court had
labeled obscenity as unprotected speech, but had since failed to render a majority
opinion setting forth a clear standard to govern obscenity.227 The Court in Miller
successfully produced a majority opinion setting forth such standards, although it
did so without deciding the underlying case.228
Before Miller, the only definition of obscenity that rendered a majority came
from Roth v. United States.229 There, the Court adopted the following test to determine if material was obscene: “whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals
to prurient interest.”230 After Roth, in Memoirs v. Massachusetts a three-Justice plurality
added a third prong to the Roth test, requiring that the material be “utterly without
redeeming social value.”231 In just seven years, however, the Court was ready to alter
its definition yet again.
In Miller, the Court developed three “basic guidelines” for a trier of fact in an
obscenity case.232 To be obscene, first, an “‘average person, applying contemporary
community standards’ [must] find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest.”233 Second, the work must “depict[] or describe [], in a patently
223
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offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law.”234
Third, “the work, taken as a whole, [must] lack[] serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value.”235 This third prong loosened the Memoirs test, while the second
prong established that the states would now have the primary role in regulating and
defining obscenity.236 In this way, the Court was able to assemble a new test, while
largely avoiding attempting to construct a true, functional definition.237 Instead, it
left that task to the states.238
Throughout the Miller decision, both the majority and the dissent indicate that
the Court has encountered serious difficulty in defining obscenity.239 One might
think that this difficulty—and the accompanying threat of stifling expression—
would make the Court question whether it is necessary to regulate obscenity. After
all, the focus of obscenity is largely on whether material is sexual and offensive,240
and regulation of such material is not typically thought to be a compelling government interest.241 Instead, the Miller majority simply took for granted that obscenity
was unprotected, without delving into why that is.242
Instead, the Court cited three cases, which had also held that obscenity was unprotected.243 One case was Roth.244 The other two cases justify their conclusion that
obscenity is unprotected by citing Roth.245 Thus, it would appear that the Miller
Court found the rationale in Roth to be sufficient.
Roth relied primarily on an analysis of laws in effect at the time of the ratification of the First Amendment.246 Finding a long history of prohibiting obscene and
profane speech from the adoption of the First Amendment to the time of its decision,
the Court concluded that obscenity was not protected.247 The Roth Court did not
undertake a balancing analysis, nor did it undertake any other kind of normative
234
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assessment.248 Thus, the Roth decision was made under a historical-categorical
analysis.249 The Miller Court accepted Roth as valid without providing further justification, thereby accepting Roth as sufficient to justify a categorical First Amendment exception for obscene speech.250 Even a Court that was willing to deviate from
historical traditions—such as when it protected commercial speech soon after
Miller251—was still tempted by a historical-categorical analysis.
Likely, this is because the idea of unprotected speech categories—regardless of
whether formulated under the historical-categorical approach or the balancingcategorical approach—is rooted in Chaplinsky.252 It would be difficult to justify the
central idea of the relevant passage in Chaplinsky—that some categories of speech
are categorically unprotected—without accepting the list of examples that follows
the passage.253 None of the unprotected speech categories in the original Chaplinsky
list have since become protected.254
The problem with relying on Chaplinsky is that the Court offered little in the
way of justification for its holding in that case.255 The decision itself is only seven
pages long, and the first three pages are devoted to the syllabus and a summary of
the facts.256 Over the next two pages, the Court stated that the First Amendment is not
absolute and that there are narrow exceptions to the First Amendment.257 The Court
described the unprotected speech categories and explained the rationale relied on for
both the historical-categorical and balancing approaches to unprotected speech.258
The Court then went on to define “fighting words” as statements that “men of common intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight,” and justified the exception as protecting against a “breach of the
peace.”259 Each step in the Court’s analysis was only justified perfunctorily, if at all.260
With such little justification for such a decision, a proponent of unprotected
speech categories has two options: (1) try to keep the concept of unprotected speech
categories in Chaplinsky without the list; or (2) search for justifications for the list.
The first option leaves Chaplinsky open to a good deal of criticism; once one starts
248
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eliminating those parts of Chaplinsky that were justified only weakly or not at all,
little will be left of the case.261 The second option is likely more palatable to those who
generally like the holding in Chaplinsky; it allows the case to stand in its entirety. Thus,
there is a clear temptation to try to find justifications for the Chaplinsky decision in
its entirety, and one tempting justification is evidently history and tradition.262
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court needs to allow itself to change so that it can leave bad laws
in the past. Some of the Court’s brightest moments came when it rejected bad laws
of the past in favor of a more just future. “Separate but equal” was the law of the
land until the Court held that it was not.263 The Equal Protection Clause was interpreted as allowing sexist discrimination until the Court held that it did not.264 It would
be hubris to think that somehow the Court is doing nothing today that subsequent
generations will not look back upon with scorn.
By adopting a framework that encourages a continuing normative analysis and
rejecting a framework that outsources those considerations to the past, the Supreme
Court will better protect against rigid enforcement of unjust laws. In the First Amendment context, strict scrutiny mandates that the Court engages in an ongoing valuedriven analysis, while the historical-categorical approach would encourage blind
faith in the practices of past generations.265 During the 1960s and 1970s, the Court
was able to reject the artificial rigidity of the historical-categorical approach to better
protect Americans’ speech rights.266 In light of both the descriptive frailty and normative failure of the historical-categorical approach, the Court ought to abandon it in
favor of a First Amendment jurisprudence centered on strict scrutiny.
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